David Benatar’s chapter “Why Coming Into Existence is Always a Harm” from his book Better Never To Have Been (2006) is delightfully clever in the way that it challenges our intuitions and seemingly escapes objection. However, after examining the structure of his argument—with the help of others—I have realized that his argument relies on an alleged qualitative commensurability between existence and non-existence. So in order for Benatar’s arguments to hold, it must be the case that non-existent states of affairs can be better off or worse off than existing states of affairs. In what follows, I will outline why we do not find qualitative comparisons between existence and non-existence satisfactory. But before I do that, I will need to say a bit about Benatar’s argument.
Benatar frequently uses a table to show various comparisons between existence and non-existence. His favored table looks like the one below.
This table sets the stage for Benatar’s conclusion that never existing is a better state of affairs than existing. It seems patent however that non-existence entails more than a mere absence of pain or pleasure; it entails a lack of qualitative value altogether. This means that nothing qualitative can be said about Scenario B, and nothing with qualitative value can be compared (qualitatively) with Scenario B. So Benatar’s table contains at least one error: assigning qualitative value to non-existence.
At one point in his chapter, Benatar describes pleasures and pains as having values that are either greater than, less than, or no greater/less than one another. In this same section, he poses the possibility of appraising the value of non-existence as zero (Benatar, 44). He says this move has a problem: it does agree with his inaugural table. I propose that there is a more pressing problem: non-existence has no qualitative value. It is not even a zero value; it is non-value. So the table I propose looks more like this.
This seems to be a more accurate and reasonable account of non-existence. And if this is how we should conceptualize non-existence, the we should not be able to make the comparison that Benatar needs to make in order to draw his conclusion.
But perhaps I have not made a sufficient case for true non-existence. To help with this, we can appeal to quantified logic. Imagine trying to compose Benatar’s proposition in logic-ese. It would go something like this:
There exists an X and a Y such that X does not exist and Y does exist, and X is better off than Y (notice the contradiction).
Here we have only one proposition and we seem to have encountered a contradiction. This should indicate that the proposition, or at least one of the premises which produced it, is suspect. Now, it might be that this proposition can be saved via some elaborate proof. If such a proof manifested, then my argument would no doubt be less severe. However, the argument that Benatar puts forth is nothing like a proof.
To be fair to Benatar I should include his disclaimer. He told us that when we are comparing existence with non-existence, we are not comparing two conditions of a single guy. Instead, we are “[comparing] his existence with an alternative state of affairs in which he does not exist” (Benatar, 22). Though this might seem like a clever work-around, Benatar’s state of affairs model will still have to deal with a proposition like “a state of affairs S in which some X exists and X does not exist.” It is clear that I do not take Benatar to have dealt satisfactorily with this proposition.
Before moving on to the next point, I will give an example of a true attempt to compare existence and non-existence and demonstrate its inability to produce Benatar’s conclusions. Rather than completely reinvent material, we can reuse some of Benatar’s material.
Imagine two people: S (Sick) and H (Healthy). S has a severe chronic illness and H is a spitting image of health. Now imagine that both S and H do not exist. Are they more healthy or less healthy by not existing?
This question will strike many as wrong-headed, and rightly so. The reason is that it demands an impossible comparison: that between the quality of health of existing persons and the non-quality of true non-existence. Since my example is more apt than Benatar’s example—in virtue of the fact that it actually compares existence and true non-existence—and it does not support Benatar’s conclusion, we can feel comfortable not adopting the conclusions that Benatar draws from his example.
So how did Benatar’s argument ever get off the ground? We might claim that it never did. This is my position. Still, to many it will seem that it did get off the ground. This seeming might be a result of the fact that Benatar never really compares existence with true non-existence; he compares it with counterfactual existence. This is apparent in his language throughout the chapter:
“…we understand the claim that somebody would have been better off not coming into existence as the assertion that that being’s never existing would have been preferable” (Benatar, 26).
A grammatical examination of this sentence reveals that Benatar is trying to talk about a being that possesses the quality of not existing. If such a concept if even conceivable, then it is surely not the concept of true non-existence.
“…one harms somebody by bringing him into existence if his existence is such that never bringing him into existence would have been preferable” (Benatar, 28).
In this case, non-existence has some quality that makes it preferable to some other possible quality. But true non-existence does not have quality, so Benatar is still not talking about true non-existence.
“…pain, disappointment, anxiety, grief, and death….None of this befalls the non-existent“ (Benatar, 29).
In this sentence Benatar mentions “the non-existent” as if it is a set of stuff that exists in one way or another—after all, he gives it his own rigid designator. We can deduce this from his sentence by looking at how Benatar tries to draw attention to the fact that certain things cannot befall this set. If he was talking about true non-existence, there would be no stuff (or set of stuff) to be the victim of anything, and his statement would be platitudinous. Here too then we cannot take Benatar to be talking about true non-existence.
“…with reference to the potential interests of a person who either does or does not exist” (Benatar, 30).
Benatar takes persons who either do or do not exist to have potential interests. This implies that it is possible, with the help of other premises, to say that persons who do not exist have potential interests. So this too is not true non-existence he is talking about.
“[the claim that the absence of pain is good] says that this absence is good when judged in terms of the interests of the person who would otherwise have existed. We may not know who that person would have been, but we can still say that whoever that person would have been, the avoidance of his or her pains is good when judged in terms of his or her interests. If there is any (obviously loose) sense in which the absent pain is good for the person who could have existed but does not, this is it” (Benatar, 31).
Benatar alleges that the interests and persons that “would have been” should serve as a proxies for non-existent persons and non-existent interests. If this argument is conceivable, then we might take Benatar as actually talking about true non-existence. However, even if this argument is conceivable, we are entirely without reason to accept its reliance on yet another suspect metaphysical relationship: the relationship between counterfactual existence and non-existence.
So we see clearly that Benatar is not actually making the comparison he needs to be making (despite his assurance in footnote 22 that he is). And if he was making the proper comparison, then his conclusions would not follow. This second point becomes transparent when we translate one of his alleged comparisons into a comparison between existence and true non-existence:
[the claim that the absence of pain is good] says that this absence is good when judged in terms of [nothing]. We may not know [nothing], but we can still say that [nothing] is good when judged in terms of [nothing]. If there is any (obviously loose) sense in which [nothing] is good for [nothing], this is it (translated from Benetar, 31).
If we do this type of translating on Benatar’s comparisons, then we find that his conclusions do not follow (and Benatar’s table will look more like figure 1.2). One might be tempted to criticize Benatar for not being more careful about this, but I think we might also admire his impressively careful wording and clever use of the conditional tense, which make his otherwise unconvincing argument seem convincing.
At this point I have shown what a proper qualitative comparison between existence and true non-existence would look like—namely, a non-comparison. We have also shown how Benatar has deviated from what is proper. This brings us to a final plea for Benatar’s conclusion.
One might respond to this paper by saying, “Listen, maybe Benatar’s comparisons are good enough. Perhaps counterfactual existence is close enough to non-existence to make his argument work.”
This is another argument which might seem to do some work at first glance, but it loses its force when we try to answer the following question: from where do people “come into” existence? We do not come into existence from counterfactual existence. If existent people cross existential barriers on their way to existence, then it would be the barrier between true non-existence and existence (1). To say otherwise would be to commit to a bizarre dualism about personal identity that would rival the most primitive and otherworldly metaphysical theses. Though some people might be willing to believe in such a dualism, I imagine they would amount to a small minority in the philosophical community. And although beliefs are not falsifiable in virtue of their being held by a mere minority, they can certainly be thusly shown to lack overall appeal.
At this point we have reviewed the proper relationship between existence and non-existence, shown how Benatar deviates from this propriety, and shown how an attempt to rescue Benatar will fail. So, on the proper view, when we are wondering about whether it is better not to exist (than to exist), then our most prudent response might be to stop wondering. Without a meaningful comparison between the two, there is simply no way to adjudicate (2).
(1) Benatar hedges himself from this issue by espousing a gradualist view of coming into existence, morally speaking (Benatar, 26). He says that there is no point that could be described as the “stage ‘just after one comes into existence’” (ibid.), but he does not tell us where he thinks people come into existence from. His silence on this point might also contribute to the seeming that comparisons between existence and counterfactual existence is ‘good enough’ for his argument.
(2) As always, I concede that I might have erred somewhere in the post, so I welcome feedback and objections. Also, I welcome your suggestions for further reading.